On November 22nd 1963, President John Fitzgerald Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. This act of carefully planned violence prevented a true presidential legacy from forming. Questions framed in ‘what if’ American history lenses, since his assassination frequently are debated. Just a frequent as these what if scenarios are the placement of judgment on a legacy which didn’t even last a full term.
To grade Kennedy’s legacy based on less than 3 years of service is a difficult task. You can’t compare his grade to one term Presidents who get voted out of office, because Kennedy’s popularity was far higher than the average popularity you would find with a one term President, yet you also can’t compare Kennedy with a two term president who got the full time to enact his agenda.
Kennedy’s future agenda included a possible second term as president in following likely re-election in 1964, the civil rights movement, and Vietnam. Historians look at the Kennedy administration in many different ways. Some see a future that was cut short and a promising step towards many American achievements. Others see his second term as the time when Kennedy would have found himself in the same shoes as Lyndon Johnson, hard up for answers on Vietnam.
Four historians with four different vantage points reflect on the short 1,000 days of the Kennedy administration. After consideration of these arguments and a comparison with President Kennedy’s own words, I believe that President Kennedy was looking at a gradual removal of troops from Vietnam starting with 1,000 by the end of 1963 and completing the remaining amounts in 1965. However this was not to be done until after the 1964 elections, due to the fear of the public viewing him as a Communist sympathizer. Then a tragic point in time only a day after President Kennedy was buried, the new President, Lyndon Johnson, signed Memorandum 273. This document changed the proposed course of action for the United States in Vietnam.
George C. Herring in his book America’s Longest War, begins to explain the Kennedy confusion with Vietnam. Herring starts his Kennedy Vietnam debate in 1962. Herring explained that Kennedy was looking at Vietnam, not for withdrawal due to problems in Vietnam, but due to America’s other global requirements. He also explains that by 1963 Kennedy was following pentagon suggestions for creating a plan due to the countless acts of insurgencies in Vietnam.
Herring also mentions that Kennedy aids have been quoted saying that Kennedy wanted to pull troops to “avoid an open-ended commitment in Vietnam.” This differs from what Johnson did following the Kennedy assassination. Herring related the eventual plan for withdrawal to his “concern about Vietnam and the increasingly strained relationship with Ngo Dinh Diem, President of South Vietnam.”
Herring agrees with thoughts that were expressed from former Kennedy aides about Kennedy having doubts about a possible withdrawal. Herring quoted the speech that Kennedy was to give on the day of his death, “commitments in third-world counties could be painful, risky and costly but we dare no weary of the test.”
Herring points out the difference he felt Kennedy had prior to the assassination of Diem. Herring asserted Kennedy felt the Diem relationship may force the United States out of Vietnam, but when assassinated Kennedys opinion towards a withdrawal changed. Herring ends up proposing that only Kennedy could truly tell us what he wanted with Vietnam, but looking at the evidence Kennedy was weary of the Diem relationship but after the coup was ready to stay in Vietnam.
Kenneth O’Donnell in his book Johnny we Hardly Knew Ye: A Memoir of President John F Kennedy shows an chorological up close look at President Kennedy and his actions regarding Vietnam. His memoir shows the ideas and actions expressed by Kennedy since the beginning of his presidential career. He begins with 1961 explaining Kennedy’s views after hearing Charles de Gaulle warn him that Vietnam was a lost cause.
O’Donnell continues with Kennedy’s next major words on withdrawal from Vietnam that came in the spring of 1963 where Kennedy is quoted agreeing with Mike Mansfield about a complete military withdrawal from Vietnam, “I have been having serious second thoughts about the Senator’s words and I think we need a complete military withdrawal from Vietnam. But I can’t do it until 1965, after I’m reelected.” This shows that Kennedy did want out but was worried about his political future if he backed out from this anti-communist commitment. Kennedy continued in the same conversation with, “If I pull out now from Vietnam, we would have another Joe McCarthy red scare on our hands, but I can do it after I am reelected, so let’s make damned sure that I am reelected.”
National Security Memorandum was the next point in O’Donnell’s view of Kennedy and Vietnam. He explains how Kennedy ordered Robert McNamara to announce with National Security Memorandum 263 for a withdrawal of 1,000 troops by the end of 1963 and completed by 1965. O’Donnell explains that by making McNamara announce this plan it takes much pressure off the president regarding exit strategies and reasoning. He also goes on to say that this plan was in effect until Kennedy’s death in November and then was changed only a few days later.
O’Donnell’s biggest point is when he quoted Kennedy by saying, “I will never send draftees over there to fight.” He continues with Kennedy quotes on the war including a Walter Cronkite interview where he was quoted saying, “It’s their war, they are the ones who must win or lose it.”
It is clear from O’Donnell’s use of close relationship he shared with Kennedy that he truly knew what the President felt about not only Vietnam but all of his policies. O’Donnell felt that Kennedy did want out of Vietnam but he wanted out quietly. If too much noise was made about a complete withdrawal Kennedy would be targeted as a “Communist sympathizer” and would have a very difficult time being reelected in 1964.
Several academic journals have published credible articles surrounding the Kennedy Vietnam decisions. Speculating a fictional what if scenario for American history, authors have tried to deduce based on limited, if not non-existing information as to Kennedy’s intentions. Fred Greenstein, in his article What did Eisenhower Tell Kennedy about Indochina? The politics of Misperception, claims that no one truly knows what Kennedy would have done with Vietnam.
Greenstein uses evidence from the beginning of the Kennedy presidency to show connections with Eisenhower’s views on Vietnam and how they related to Kennedy’s views. Kennedy is always remember for saying that the corner of Communism is in Southeast Asia, however Greenstein explains that Eisenhower was the one that told Kennedy that Laos was the key to Communism in Southeast Asia.
Greenstein asks the question on whether Kennedy wanted war or Eisenhower wanted war. His main thesis of his paper shows that Eisenhower should be blamed more for Vietnam than he is currently blamed. Greenstein continues saying that Eisenhower has come out with a rather unscathed image from this horrible war. His arguments show that Eisenhower used his power and reputation to persuade Kennedy into war, which allowed Johnson to get more involved, and later be the scapegoat for the war. Because of Eisenhower, Kennedy stayed longer than he would have otherwise and Kennedy would have, “handled communist advances in Southeast Asia far differently.”
Edward Cuddy’s article Vietnam: Mr. Johnson’s War or Mr. Eisenhower’s explained the Kennedy Challenge. Cuddy starts his article with a focus on Robert McNamara who served as defense secretary for both Kennedy and Johnson. Cuddy quoted McNamara, “I feel Kennedy would have accepted the loss of all of Southeast Asia-rather then send U.S. combat forces into battle.”
Cuddy uses key moments of Kennedy’s final days and his plans for withdrawal. He explains that Kennedy’s decision to wait until 1964 was the fatal mistake of his presidency because he never got to show the public what he truly wanted, and left it all up to speculation. Cuddy then follows it up by blaming Eisenhower for these Kennedy mistakes. Cuddy explains that the United States strategy that Kennedy was left with after he won the presidency was flawed. This is because Kennedy felt that “though Vietnam was in America‘s interests.” Like both Eisenhower and Johnson felt, “losing its soldiers to battle was not.”
Cuddy explains that Johnson felt that there was no alternative to sending troops to Vietnam and that this is where Kennedy and Johnson differed. Kennedy felt that if he had no choice he would give up Southeast Asia, something Johnson refused to do. Cuddy finished by explaining that Kennedy’s more advanced methods in diplomacy would have side stepped the miscalculations that Johnson could not avoid. Because of this major diplomacy factor, Kennedy would have been able to push off engagement until he was reelected without outbreak, and thus would have been able to exit safely.
Edward Cuddy felt that Kennedy’s largest mistake was waiting. Kennedy was so worried about the possible public outcry against him if he had backed out from Vietnam. In the end, due to his lack of withdrawal, Kennedy prolonged the war. He explains that Kennedy would have been looked on not only as a hero, but the man who got us out of Indochina when he truly wanted.
All of these historians have credible sources and produce credible interpretations of the Kennedy dilemma. However none can explain what President Kennedy was truly going to do better then President Kennedy himself. Several press conferences in 1963 show Kennedy’s intentions with Vietnam. Starting in May Kennedy began talks of Vietnam. By November he had announced an official withdrawal plan with the aforementioned National Security Memorandum 263.
On October 31st 1963, President Kennedy held a press conference that was printed the next day in the New York Times. The sixth question asked by reported was, “Mr. President, back to the question of troop reductions. Are there any intended in the Far East at the present time, particularly in Korea, and is there any speedup in the withdrawal from Vietnam?” This reporter was asking this Vietnam portion on his question based on the Withdrawal announcement in May of 1963 and the National Security Announcement in October by Robert McNamara. President Kennedy responded by saying, “We would expect to withdrawal 1,000 men from South Vietnam and as far as other units, we will have to make that judgment based on what the reactions are.”
This press conference is crucial because Kennedy for the first time publicly recognized the security memorandum that he had ordered McNamara and Taylor to draw up in early October. The key tone to this statement is his uneasiness to fully commit to the memorandum by saying it was Taylor and McNamara who came up with this and it is their suggestions, also saying that this may not be a full withdrawal like he has been quoted saying in private. Kennedy refused to be pinned down to either leave or staying in Vietnam so that he could look at his best options without pressure.
Herring alone argues for a Kennedy continuation in Vietnam while the other historians all argue for a Kennedy withdrawal from different angles. Despite Herring’s anti-withdrawal views a few pro-withdrawal points including that Kennedy did want out of Vietnam, and that he did have a withdrawal plan beginning in 1963 and ending in 1965. The most important point was that he was afraid of the public reaction and losing the election in 1964 because of a full withdrawal so soon after the 1950’s communist scare. To lose Southeast Asia to communism was the biggest fear of Kennedy, even worse then that however would be to escalate and lose American lives.
Herring pushes a lot of the same points that everyone else argued like the 1963 withdrawal completing in 1965. However Herring differs because he uses the Dallas slated speech to show commitment with his position on Vietnam. This speech however doesn’t hold a lot of sway with the other historians. The other historians argue that Kennedy wanted to keep his intentions secret. If Kennedy speaks on staying the course in Vietnam then it would not allow him to be perceived as soft on Communism like the other historians argue.
Kenneth O’Donnell has by far the best vantage point to Kennedy, rather then looking back at history; O’Donnell looks back at his own life with Kennedy. O’Donnell has the advantage that the other historians don’t have, which was the personal relationship he had with Kennedy and the insight into the conversation with Kennedy in private and not just what he was doing in public.
Fred Greenstein focuses less on what Kennedy was doing and more on what Kennedy was pushed into by Eisenhower and his reaction to it. O’Donnell used Kennedy’s words based on his actions and Greenstein used Kennedy’s actions based on Eisenhower’s flaws. Greenstein argued that Kennedy was misled by Eisenhower and because of this he stayed in Vietnam longer then he would have otherwise.
Cuddy takes a different approach and focuses more on the flaws of Kennedy himself. He clearly agrees that Kennedy wanted out. However Cuddy focuses more on the fact that Kennedy was being stand offish to avoid the perceptions that would have been put on him. Cuddy argued from the standpoint of the historical perceptions that have been placed on Kennedy; that because he waited so long his true intentions never showed, and in the history perspective is looked on as if he wanted to be in Vietnam.
Kennedy’s words show all of these arguments in that brief question he was asked on October 31st. He did have plans for a withdrawal, and he was standoffish towards the media for some reason. By confirming a plan for withdrawal during this press conference he confirmed everything these historians were saying. This even worked with what Herring was saying because the press conference was only 22 days before the Dallas Trade Mart speech.
It is true that no one will ever truly know what Kennedy wanted. Everyone has a speculation about what he would have done. Bobby Kennedy himself, who some believe to have been Kennedy closest confidant, had no idea what his brother was going to do. The Historians argue close to the same points that are all tied together through Kennedy’s own words.
These arguments do show and truly prove that Kennedy wanted out of Vietnam. O’Donnell saying that Kennedy was truly scared of Communist accusations and wanted to wait until 1964 to pull out. Greenstein showing Kennedy’s confusion about the entire matter up until his death in 1963. Cuddy’s main points which were in close comparison to O’Donnell backs up what Kennedy was fighting against, hiding what he truly wanted.
What did Kennedy truly want? Out of Vietnam, far away from a conflict that was laid upon him and far away from what would later be the largest black mark on the Johnson administration. A Joe McCarthy scare that plagued the 1950’s was still felt in politics in 1963. At the height of the Cold War the fight against Communism could easily be a fight at home like it was in the 1950’s. A fight that caused so much paranoia it prevented a withdrawal from Vietnam and the eventual death of thousand of Americans.
Bibliography
Associated Press, “President Kennedy Press Conference,” New York Times, November 1st 1963, sec a, 14.
Cuddy, Edward “Vietnam: Mr. Johnson‘s War - Or Mr. Eisenhower‘s?" in Review of Politics, ed. Catherine Heldt Zuckert (Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 2003).
Greenstein, Fred “What Did Eisenhower Tell Kennedy about Indochina? The Politics of Misperception,” in Journal of American History, ed. Edward T. Linenthal (Indiana: Organization of American Historians, 1992).
Herring, George, America’s Longest War: The United States in Vietnam 1950-1975, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2001).
O’Donnell, Kenneth and David F. Powers, Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970).
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